World War One and Military Mobilization

A Crucial Immediate Cause of the Great War Often Overlooked

Nov 2, 2009

In July 1914 Russian and Austrian orders for a general mobilization started the process that took millions of men to the battlefield in a prolonged and bloody war.

The causes of World War I are many and can be traced back to the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. Several more immediate causes, however, sparked the fuse that led to the outbreak of hostilities in August 1914. The July assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife Sophie in Sarajevo is one of those immediate causes. However, the effect of military mobilization is often overlooked. General mobilization was tantamount to war. At the end of July 1914, it was the mobilization orders that set into motion the Great War; once given, the orders could not be rescinded.

The von Schlieffen Plan of 1906

General Alfred von Schlieffen, as Chief of the German General Staff, had the task of completing an offensive strategy aimed chiefly at France in the war everyone knew was coming. The French had never forgiven the Germans for taking Alsace-Lorraine, imposing an indemnity, and marching triumphantly through Paris in 1871. Since that time, both nations had built up their military forces in readiness for the next war.

Von Schlieffen’s plan had to include a two-front war. Ever since the 1892 alliance between Russia and France, Germany’s eastern provinces had become vulnerable to the “Russian steamroller,” 6.5 million men in time of war including reserves. His final plan called for the elimination of France within 6 weeks (allowing for a two-week mobilization period) by committing seven-eighths of German troops to the western front.

Based on Hannibal’s double-envelopment at Cannae, German troops would march through neutral Belgium and swing south of Paris, drawing out the bulk of the French army manning the frontier fortresses. Von Schlieffen calculated that at best, Russia would complete full mobilization in six weeks, given the immensity of the country. After crushing France, German troops could be rapidly redeployed to assist the nine divisions protecting the eastern front.

Orders for General Mobilization

Following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Austria, on July 23rd, issued an ultimatum to Serbia. The assassins had been Serbians and Austria used this as an excuse to hold Serbia responsible. On the 28th, Austria declared war. Serbia turned to Russia, a long term ally. Several weeks of intense diplomatic efforts proved fruitless. Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany assured Austria of German support. Mobilization was about to trigger the intricate alliance systems that, ultimately, engulfed Europe in a prolonged and bloody war, a prospect few leaders saw at the time. This was to be a 3-4 week war. No plans were made by any of the belligerents for a longer conflict.

On July 30th both Russia and Austria issued orders for general mobilization. Germany, aware of its obligations yet still unwilling to risk war with Russia, sent a note to St. Petersburg the following day, insisting that Russia demobilize, giving Tsar Nicholas II twelve hours to respond. When the deadline passed, the Kaiser issued the order for full mobilization. The Great War had begun.

It should be noted that Russia was the crucial element in the mobilization factor. Poor roads, the lack of railroads, and antiquated communication methods contributed to the problem. Once mobilization was ordered, it was virtually impossible to rescind the order, nor was it militarily sound. Further, partial mobilization, a lesser threat, was not possible in Russia. Despite the fear of Russia’s great army, it was little better prepared for war than it had been in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

Mobilization as a Significant Factor in the Coming of War

A mobilization order was the proverbial “casting of the die.” There could be no turning back. Had the July 30th mobilization orders not been issued in favor of a diplomatic solution, the war might never have happened. As it was, few European leaders, under advice of their military general staffs, were willing to avoid war in 1914.

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