Winston Churchhill and the Gallipoli Campaign
How Britain Scorned Turkey as a Military Force in the Dardanelles
Aug 31, 2009
Winston Churchill is well known as a savvy war leader and beloved Prime Minister of Britain during the Second World War. He is not so well known as a major player in the conduct of the First World War, when, as chief proponent of the Gallipoli or Dardanelles campaign, he made several significant blunders in under-estimating the Turkish people.
Some time prior to Turkey’s entry into the war, when the country was preserving neutrality, Britain demonstrated the ethnocentric, dismissive and arrogant attitude that would govern decision-making about Turkey right throughout the conflict. Turkey had long employed British shipyards to build warships for her. The Sultan Osman and the Resadiye were nearing completion in the shipyards at the outbreak of the war. OttomanEmpire.com reveals that, despite the fact that they had been paid for, the British confiscated, renamed and used these ships in her own fleet. While it is not specified that Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, made or prompted the decision, the Navy was certainly his department and great hope.
The new leadership of impoverished Turkey had raised the money by offering medals to members of the public who contributed to the cost of the ships. The Turkish people had a sense of personal ownership of the vessels and the insult stung. According to OttomanEmpire.com, Enver Pasha signed a secret agreement with the Germans that very day.
Three Fatal Errors in the Gallipoli Campaign
Britain’s disregard for Turkey undoubtedly goaded her into the war. It is even more apparent that a blind under-valuation of Turkey’s capabilities governed the Gallipoli campaign. The Ottoman Empire had earned the epithet: “The sick man of Europe” in the 19th century and Churchill saw no reason to revise this evaluation. Despite a change of leadership, this sense of modern Turkey’s economic and military unreadiness, combined no doubt with British ethnocentric pride, led Churchill into some unsound decisions.
The Bombardment of the Outer Forts
It was reasonable for Germany to assume that the Allied interest was focused on Germany itself, France and the Suez. An attack on Turkey was not deemed likely. Why start a new front? Churchill, however, believed that a mere show of strength from the British Navy would overthrow any Turkish resistance, and allow free access all the way to the Black Sea.
Churchill went against the considered opinion of the day, including advice from his own mentor First Sea Lord ‘Jacky’ Fisher and Admiral Limpus, and ordered the bombardment of the forts that guarded the entrance to the Dardanelle Straits. This piece of flag-waving on 3 November 1914 served only to alert the Turkish and German commanders that an attack on Constantinople was on the agenda. Over the next three months, they reorganized the defence of the Straits and, according to Harvey Broadbent in Gallipoli- the Fatal Shore, laid some 330 mines and set up torpedo tubes and searchlights.
The Naval Attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula
In January 1915, Churchill again talked the War Council into a full-scale naval attack on the Straits with Constantinople (modern Istanbul) as its objective. Churchill was still convinced that one look at the might of the British Navy en masse and Turkey would crumble.
The attack was launched on February 19, and persisted despite unexpectedly heavy resistance and failure to clear the mines. The final attack was mounted on March 18 with a mighty fleet of 18 battleships and an accompanying flotilla of minesweepers, cruisers and destroyers. The result was a thorough rout. An undetected minefield claimed three ships and artillery claimed three more. The fleet turned tail: Britain’s naval reputation had been savaged and Turkish confidence given a fillip.
The Land Attack on 25 April 1915
Unbelievably, Churchill was still determined to attack Turkey, this time with a combined naval and land assault. Despite recent experience to the contrary, he still believed that, under fire, Turkish troops would turn and run. Churchill and Lord Kitchener ignored intelligence advice that indicated the Turkish Army was busy with defensive work and trenches.
A series of blunders with supplies, which saw ships returning to Egypt to be reloaded, gave the Turks even more time to prepare. There would be no surprise attack: the Turks were waiting and observing as the boats approached. There is a long-held story that boats were pulled by strong tides to the wrong landing beach - that narrow strip now known as ANZAC Cove. Broadbent says there is evidence that it was a last-minute, ill-communicated change of plan to avoid Turkish artillery.
Either way, the first troops to land were confused, gave the Turkish officers time to call up reinforcement army units, and as succeeding waves of Allied troops arrived through the morning, many were being torn apart while still in the boats approaching the beach. The moment was lost.
The Gallipoli or Dardanelles campaign has gone down in military history as a moving story of bravery and fortitude, and as an appalling example of the human cost of war. It should also be recorded as an infamous example of mismanagement and a monument to Winston Churchill’s ego and poor judgement. As a reaction to the disaster, Churchill was subsequently dropped from his lofty position and returned to the back benches. Such was the dogged nature of the man that he managed to claw his way back to prominence as Prime Minister and became one of the most revered, inspirational leader s of all time.
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